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COLLISION COURSE OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS:
FOIA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PRIVACY
CONSIDERATIONS
By, Jeffrey M. Brown
Jeff Brown is an attorney with Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer. For over a
decade, Jeff has concentrated his practice in labor and employment law. Jeff has extensive
experience as lead counsel in grievance and interest arbitration proceeding, matters before the
Illinois Labor Relations Board and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,
administrative hearings, and before state and federal courts. To maintain a balanced practice
and offer a full range of services, Jeff also represents clients in a wide array of legal matters,
including municipal governance, FOIA compliance, all aspects of higher education law,
litigation, and appellate advocacy. Jeff received his B.A. from James Madison College at
Michigan State University and J.D. from The John Marshall Law School.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of freedom of information requests that seek information
concerning virtually every aspect of governmental affairs, including
information about employees, has significantly altered the notion of privacy
in the workplace. Almost every facet of the day-to-day operations for public
sector employers and employees is subject to examination by way of
freedom of information requests.[1] From Vermont[2] to Chicago to
Washington[3] to San Jose,[4] public sector employers across the country
have faced scores of requests for information from the media and citizens
that have sought, among other things, employee emails and text messages –
both private and personal – that may shed light on the inner workings of
government as well as how government-specific events unfold.[5] For
example, the LaQuan McDonald shooting sparked public outrage but also
scores of FOIA requests from media who were investigating the incident to
learn more about how the events unfolded and what actions pubic officials
and police officers took in response to the shooting. Such FOIA requests
focused on private emails sent and received by Chicago police officers
regarding the shooting, and information about those police officers,
including their disciplinary history.
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Indeed, the purpose of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)[6]
is to ensure an informed citizenry by providing the public the right to access
government documents and records. FOIA serves as a proverbial “check
and balance” and permits the public to investigate and often scrutinize
government affairs. But for public sector employers, FOIA can have the
unintended consequence of diminishing an employee’s privacy interest in
information conveyed via employer-issued or personal technology. Despite
numerous express exemptions in FOIA, public sector employers have been
forced to reveal information, including among other things, disciplinary
history, employee work product communications made over personal and
private devices, even employee schedules, in order to comply with requests
for information, sometimes at the expense of privacy, thereby blurring the
boundaries between personal and workplace communications. While public
sector employees generally have little to no expectation of privacy in
communications or work product created on employer-issued technology
and equipment, employees cannot use private devices to circumvent
transparency and the disclosure obligations required by FOIA.[7] But
personal privacy appears to be up for grabs and now within the reach of
FOIA given a developing precedent in case law and administrative law that
hold private communications[8] subject to disclosure under FOIA.[9]
FOIA’s objective to foster greater transparency in governmental affairs
often conflicts with core requirements of collective bargaining agreements
that, in some instances, set forth broad protections for represented
employees, including preserving their privacy. Unions have negotiated
privacy provisions within collective bargaining agreements in an attempt to
protect and preserve the privacy of their membership. When these privacy
protections in collective bargaining agreements intersect with FOIA,
however, the privacy lines are blurred even more. In particular, the
interplay between FOIA and collective bargaining agreements presents
challenging legal issues concerning FOIA’s foundational purpose of shining
light on government activity, and potential conflicts with collective
bargaining agreements and other laws. There can be no dispute that FOIA
requires disclosure of records in the possession of a public body at the time
of the request. A privacy protection embedded in a collective bargaining
agreement that renders a public record private is contrary to the public
policy expressed in Section 1 of FOIA as well as disclosure obligations
placed on public bodies. It is likely that an arbitrator would not have
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authority to uphold such a privacy protection because doing so would
conflict with FOIA’s broad purpose to enlarge transparency in the public
sector[10].
This article will provide an overview of FOIA and the collision course it has
inadvertently manufactured with obligations under collective bargaining
agreements, as well as employee privacy interests. It will offer suggestions
for how public sector employers can best supervise, control, and operate an
efficient workplace complying with FOIA without unreasonably invading
employee privacy.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE FOIA, IPRLA, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A.

FOIA: An Overview of the Illinois Transparency Law

FOIA is a state statute that provides the public the right to access
government documents and records including information about
employees.[11] FOIA contains neither an exemption for, nor any reference
to, collective bargaining agreements that obligate parties to keep employee
information private. But FOIA does broadly provide that the disclosure of
public records is in the public interest and a tool for the public to learn
more about the activities and inner workings of government. The preamble
of FOIA establishes the public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons
are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of
government and the official acts and polices of public officials and public
employees, and that, therefore, public records are to be accessible to the
citizens of the State, unless access is specifically exempted under the terms
of FOIA.[12] Section 1 of FOIA sets forth the public policy and clearly
favors disclosure in public records, stating in relevant part:
Restraints on access to information, to the extent permitted by this Act, are
limited exceptions to the principle that the people of this State have a right to full
disclosure of information relating to the decisions, policies, procedures, rules,
standards, and other aspects of government activity that affect the conduct of
government and the lives of any or all of the people.[13]

FOIA is further grounded in the principle that the public should be able to
access public records and information about the workings of their
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government.[14] Specifically, FOIA provides that a person may ask a public
body for a copy of its records on a specific subject and the public body must
provide those records, unless there is an exemption in the statute that
protects those records from disclosure (for example, records containing
information concerning trade secrets or personal privacy). Under FOIA,
“[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to
be open to inspection or copying,”[15] and “[e]ach public body shall make
available to any person for inspection or copying all public records, except
as otherwise provided in Section 7 of th[e] Act.”[16]
1.

Exemptions From Disclosure Under FOIA

Not all information is subject to the disclosure obligations under FOIA.
Accordingly, a public body “must comply with a valid request for
information unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in
section 7 of FOIA applies.”[17]
Section 7 lists classes and subclasses
exempt from inspection and copying.[18] Section 7.5 sets forth a list of
exemptions derived from other Illinois statutes.[19] Among the FOIA
exemptions of most interest to public sector employees and public sector
employers are the following:


Private information, which is defined as “unique identifiers, including a
person’s Social Security number, driver’s license number, employee
identification number, biometric identifiers, personal financial
information, passwords or other access codes, medical records, home or
personal telephone numbers, and personal e-mail addresses.” Under
FOIA, “private information also includes home addresses and personal
license plate numbers, except as otherwise provided by law or when
compiled without possibility of attribution to any person.”[20]



Personal information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is
consented to in writing by the person who is the subject of the
information. Under FOIA, the “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”
means the “disclosure of information that is highly personal or
objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject’s right to
privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the
information.” Disclosing information that relates to the public duties of
public employees is not considered an invasion of personal privacy.[21]
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Law enforcement records that, if disclosed, would interfere with a pending
or reasonably contemplated proceeding or that would disclose the identity
of a confidential source.[22]
Information that, if disclosed, might endanger anyone’s life or physical
safety.[23]



Preliminary drafts or notes in which opinions are expressed or policies are
formulated, unless the record is publicly cited and identified by the head
of the public body.[24]



Business trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is
proprietary, privileged or confidential and disclosure would cause a
competitive harm to the person or business.[25]



Requests that are “unduly burdensome.”[26]

The exemptions enumerated in Section 7 establish a framework for
assessing and balancing various interests, including personal privacy,
against the public’s interest in disclosure. Although each exemption is
subject to interpretation, no specific exemption exists for collective
bargaining obligations that may exist between a union and public sector
employer. At the same time, parties are not free to bargain around FOIA by
negotiating and thereby creating exemptions.
2.

The Public Records Definition

FOIA broadly defines what constitutes a public record. “Public records,” a
term of art used throughout FOIA, is broadly defined in Section 2(c), which
sets forth a definition containing a multitude of synonyms:
all records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, maps,
photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data processing
records, electronic communications, recorded information and all other
documentary materials.[27]

This list is not exhaustive and subject to broad interpretation. For example,
“writings” broadly interpreted could certainly encompass email messages,
text messages, or social media posts issued on employer-issued computers,
requiring a public body to disclose such documents. The same can be said
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about “reports” “papers” or “recorded information” which are all subject to
a broad interpretation.
Particularly illustrative of FOIA’s reach into emails and text messages is
that the term “public records” now includes as part of its definition
“electronic communications.” Again, the interpretation is quite broad but
shows anything is within FOIA’s grasp. The question of whether this
extends to emails from a personal or private account, or whether it includes
only emails on public computers or through public accounts remains
unsettled and is also the subject of two FOIA lawsuits pending in the Circuit
Court of Cook County.[28]
3.

Pertinent PAC Opinions Concerning Privacy

While the debate continues, the Illinois Attorney General Public Access
Counselor’s (“PAC”)[29] position on the issue is crystal clear – public
officials and employees’ private email or text messages created in
furtherance of government business constitute public records subject to
disclosure under FOIA.[30] In early decisions on requests to review, the
PAC has affirmatively held that emails are subject to FOIA even if they are
on a public official’s personal device, account or computer.[31]
In PAC Opinion 11-006 involving the City of Champaign and its City
Council, for example, the PAC issued its first binding opinion regarding the
denial of a reporter's FOIA request for text messages, emails, and other
electronic records on public officials’ personal cell phones and other
devices.[32] The City of Campaign had argued that the records were not
“public records” subject to release because they were issued on private
devices, but the PAC disagreed and determined that the City of
Champaign violated FOIA when it failed to disclose the emails and text
messages sent by City Council members.[33] According to the PAC opinion,
the key determinant is whether the emails related to public business.[34]
Because the City Council members were using private devices to conduct
city business, public records were created thereby triggering an obligation
under FOIA to disclose. PAC Opinion 11-006 was appealed to the circuit
court, and then the Fourth District Appellate Court which upheld the PAC
opinion that the text messages were releasable, but on more limited
grounds than expressed by the PAC. [35] This decision was the first instance
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in Illinois where private emails were found to be subject to disclosure under
FOIA.
The PAC recently revisited the issue as to whether private emails are
subject to disclosure under FOIA in a case involving the Chicago Police
Department and CNN. In that case, CNN requested private emails of police
officers who were involved in the Laquan McDonald shooting. In PAC
Opinion 16-006, the PAC found the Chicago Police Department in violation
of FOIA when it failed to provide copies of emails sent or received by
Chicago police officers on their private accounts that related to the Laquan
McDonald shooting.[36] The City had provided the requester with emails
that were sent or received on the officers' official City email accounts or
were found on the City server. The City did not provide any emails on the
officers' personal email accounts on the grounds that the emails were not
public records because the City did not have any control over the officers'
personal devices, and the emails were not used by, received by, in the
possession of, or under the control of a public body.[37] The PAC ruled
against the City, finding that “communications pertaining to the
transaction of public business that were sent or received on the Chicago
Police Department employees’ personal e-mail accounts are 'public records'
under the definition of that term in section 2(c) of FOIA."[38] The PAC
noted that any other interpretation would be "contrary to the General
Assembly's intent of ensuring public access to full and complete
information regarding the affairs of government."[39]
B.

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“IPLRA”) contains numerous
protections for employees.[40] However, it does not explicitly reference
how it may square conflicts with FOIA should the two statutes interact and
potentially create a conflict. Instead, the IPLRA explicitly provides a broad
remedy for conflicts with other laws impacting wages, hours and working
conditions as well as conflicts between collective bargaining agreements
and other laws.[41]
Where a conflict exists between a local ordinance or law and a public
employer collective bargaining agreement, Illinois statute and case law
provide that the IPLRA or collective bargaining agreement will take
precedence.[42] According to Section 15 (a):
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In case of any conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law (other
than Section 5 of the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 and other
than the changes made to the Illinois Pension Code by Public Act 96-889 and
other than as provided in Section 7.5), executive order or administrative
regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and
employment relations, the provisions of this Act or any collective bargaining
agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and control.[43]
Section 15 (b) of the IPLRA provides:
[A]ny collective bargaining contract between a public employer and a labor
organization executed pursuant to this Act shall supersede any contrary statutes,
charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions
of employment and employment relations adopted by the public employer or its
agents.[44]

Section 15 clearly gives precedence to the IPLRA or a collective bargaining
agreement only if there is a “conflict” pertaining to wages, hours and
working conditions between the IPLRA and the other statute, or if the other
statute is “contrary” to a collective bargaining agreement.[45] In other
words, Illinois law declares that a collective bargaining agreement
supersedes any conflicting statute or ordinance relating to wages, hours and
working conditions.[46] Despite the absence of any reference to FOIA,
Section 15 is the vehicle that unions may be able to rely upon when
challenging disclosure that conflicts with privacy provisions within a
collective bargaining agreement.
C.

Collective Bargaining Agreements And Privacy Protections

Without question, unions have negotiated not only traditional issues such
as higher wages and better working conditions, but also widespread
protections that relate to employee privacy. Unions have historically
negotiated provisions aimed at increasing employee privacy, particularly in
the use of employee records, primarily disciplinary records, as well as
privacy provisions related to substance abuse and employee assistance
programs. Recognizing the increased demands placed on public sector
employers, unions now negotiate broader privacy protections for their
membership, including confidentiality of information in connection with
investigation and processing of employee grievances, confidentiality of
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medical records, employer surveillance, including telephonic and GPS
monitoring, and electronic monitoring of communications.
Both the Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 (“FOP”)[47] and
Police Benevolent Protective Association - Chicago (“PBPA”) have
negotiated several provisions in their collective bargaining agreements with
the City of Chicago aimed at protecting the privacy of police officers by
curbing the release of Complaint Register (CR) files which are generated
whenever a citizen files a complaint against a police officer. For example,
Section 8.4 of the FOP collective bargaining agreement with the City
provides the following regarding CR files:
All disciplinary investigation files, disciplinary history card entries,
Independent Police Review Authority and Internal Affairs Division
disciplinary records, and any other disciplinary record or summary of
such record other than records related to Police Board cases, will be
destroyed five (5) years after the date of the incident or the date upon
which the violation is discovered, whichever is longer, except that not
sustained files alleging criminal conduct or excessive force shall be
retained for a period of seven (7) years after the date of the incident or
the date upon which the violation is discovered, whichever is longer,
and thereafter, cannot be used against the officer in any future
proceedings in any other forum, except as specified below, unless the
investigation relates to a matter which has been subject to either civil
or criminal court litigation or arbitration prior to the expiration of the
five (5) year period. In such instances, the Complaint Register case
files normally will be destroyed immediately after the date of the final
arbitration award or the final court adjudication, unless a pattern of
sustained infractions exists.[48]
Section 8.4 of the PBPA collective bargaining agreement with the City of Chicago
is almost identical:
All Disciplinary Investigative Files, Disciplinary History Card Entries, Office of
Professional Standard or Independent Police Review Authority disciplinary
records, and any other disciplinary record or summary of such record other than
Police Board cases, will be purged from the online file system five (5) years after
the date of the incident or the date upon which the violation is discovered,
whichever is longer, and therefore, will not be used against the Sergeant in any
future disciplinary proceedings, unless the investigation relates to a matter which
has been subject to either civil or criminal court litigation or arbitration prior to
the expiration of the five (5) year period. In such instances, the Complaint
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Register case files will be purged from the online file system five (5) years after
the date of the final arbitration award or the final court adjudication, unless a
pattern of sustained infractions exists.[49]

The FOP has obtained additional terms that protect police officer private
information. Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement sets forth an
officer’s Bill of Rights, and expressly provides in Section 6.8:
An Officer shall not be required to disclose any item of his or her property,
income, assets, source of income, debts, or personal or domestic expenditures
(including those of any member of his or her family or household) unless such
information is reasonably necessary to monitor the performance of the Officer's
job, violations of reasonable Employer rules, statutes, ordinances, or this
Agreement. In the administration of fringe benefits applicable to all employees of
the Employer, Officers covered by this Agreement may be required to disclose
any coverage they (including any member of their families or households) may
have under health or medical insurance and the name and appropriate
identification of the carrier and coverage. The parties agree that the disclosure of
such personal information shall not be made available for public inspection or
copying because such would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of
the Officer, and/or is intended to otherwise be exempt from any state or local
freedom of information statute, ordinance or executive order.[50]

Other unions also have negotiated privacy protections for their
membership. For example, “the Teamsters and UPS, and the City of
Orlando and its police union, have negotiated about employer use of GPS
technology.”[51] Other unions have negotiated privacy protections for
members who use personal devices (e.g., cell phones or laptops),[52] while
other unions have negotiated side agreements pertaining to the use of
surveillance cameras in the workplace.[53] In addition, “[t]he California
State Employees Association has negotiated with the state about electronic
entry and exit monitoring systems in correctional facilities, one using
fingerprints.”[54]
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III.

CASES IMPACTING PRIVACY FOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYERS

A.

City of Champaign v. Madigan: FOIA Requests For Private
Emails

The first court decision on whether private emails are subject to FOIA was
an appeal of PAC Opinion 11-006 as noted above. In City of Champaign v.
Madigan, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District upheld the
PAC’s opinion that the City of Springfield’s communications on privately
owned devices are subject to release under FOIA. The Fourth District held
that text messages sent on private devices are releasable under certain
limited circumstances: (1) if forwarded to an official account; (2) if sent
during a meeting; or (3) if sent to a majority of the public body
members.[55] As the Fourth District acknowledged, FOIA does not
expressly provide that communications on private devices are subject to
FOIA. The court observed:
If the General Assembly intends for communications pertaining to city business
to and from an individual city council member’s personal electronic device to be
subject to FOIA in every case, it should expressly so state. It is not this court’s
function to legislate. Indeed, such issues are legislative matters best left to
resolution by the General Assembly.[56]

In other words, messages sent on private devices are only considered
"public records" that might be subject to FOIA when the official sending or
receiving the message is acting as a public body. The court’s rationale is
that the public body is not in control or possession of messages of
government officials when sent on the officials’ private devices except in
certain limited circumstances.
B.

Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit 5 v. City of Springfield:
FOIA Requests for Internal Affairs Files

In 2013, several news organizations filed a FOIA request with the City of
Springfield seeking internal affairs files for certain police officers[57]. The
collective bargaining agreement between the City of Springfield and PBPA
No. 5 contained a provision that mandated destruction of internal affairs
files related to police officers that were more than five years old (similar to
the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreements between
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both the FOP and PBPA and City of Chicago)[58]. However, the City of
Springfield did not destroy the internal affairs files older than five years as
required by the collective bargaining agreement.[59] To stop the release of
the internal affairs files pursuant to the FOIA request, the PBPA No. 5
sought emergency injunctive relief claiming that (1) the collective
bargaining agreements destruction provision operated as a de facto
protective shield that prohibited release of the requested files; and (2) the
collective bargaining agreements destruction requirement trumped
FOIA.[60]
Finding these arguments unpersuasive, in Police Benevolent & Protective
Ass’n Unit No. 5 v. City of Springfield, the Circuit Court of Sangamon
County denied the PBPA No. 5’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
holding that the City of Springfield’s failure to destroy internal affairs files
older than five years as required by the collective bargaining agreement
“has no effect on whether or not they are subject to the Freedom of
Information Act.”[61] In balancing the conflict clause set forth in Section
15 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act against the transparency
requirements under FOIA, the circuit court found in favor of FOIA, holding
that “when these two provisions of the same act are read together it is clear
the legislature did not intend for a collective bargaining agreement to
supersede an existing state statute.”[62] The Circuit Court also reasoned
that to accept the PBPA No. 5’s argument would permit the “parties of a
collective bargaining agreement the luxury of contracting away any state
law they deemed offensive.”[63] Nothing in the Public Labor Relations Act
can be read to suggest the legislature intended to permit this absurd
result.”[64] Put another way, no part of FOIA exempts from disclosure
records that should have been destroyed by contract, and therefore,
disclosure was required because the internal affairs files were in the City of
Springfield’s possession.
C.

Kalven v. City of Chicago: FOIA Requests For Misconduct
Complaints

In a case concerning citizen complaints lodged against Chicago police
officers, the plaintiff in Kalven v. City of Chicago, sought disclosure of
certain documents related to complaints of police misconduct within the
Chicago Police Department in the form of Complaint Registers (CR) and
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Repeater Lists (RL).[65] The issue on appeal was whether the CRs and RLs
were “adjudicatory” and exempt under Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.
When responding to FOIA requests for CRs, the Chicago Police Department
traditionally withheld them, arguing that they were exempt under various
subsections of FOIA Section 7. In Kalven, however, the Illinois Appellate
Court rejected this argument, which the court described as being “at odds
with the purpose of FOIA, which is ‘to open public records to the light of
public scrutiny.’”[66] The First District held that both CRs and RLs must be
disclosed and are not exempt under Section 7(1)(n) because they were not
part of any adjudication.[67] The First District recognized that it was
possible that another FOIA exemption may apply to the CRs and RLs, e.g.,
the deliberative process exemption.[68] However, whether the deliberativeprocess exemption applied would be resolved after an “in camera” (private)
inspection by the trial court judge after the case was remanded for further
proceedings.[69] The appellate court also held that lists of officers who
accumulated the most CRs between 2001 and 2006, which were produced
in response to court-ordered civil discovery in other cases, were not exempt
under FOIA.[70] And although there was a protective order governing
disclosure of the lists in the underlying civil cases, the appellate court held
that the protective order did not have “any bearing on [Chicago Police
Department’s] duty to disclose the [lists] pursuant to a FOIA request.”[71]
In light of Kalven, the Chicago Police Department notified all police officers
members on October 23, 2014, that it planned to release the lists on
October 31, 2014. The Chicago Police Department provided copies of the
lists to the plaintiff, as well as other unions representing Chicago Police
Department employees.
D.

1.

Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago:
FOIA Requests for Police Officer Complaints

Background

The Independent Police Review Authority (“IPRA”) and Chicago Police
Department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs are agencies that have authority to
investigate complaints against Chicago Police Department personnel[72],
and to recommend discipline to the Superintendent for violations of
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department rules and regulations.[73] Documents generated by these
investigations are commonly referred to as complaint register files or CR
files.[74] In August 2014, the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times
submitted FOIA requests for lists of all complaints filed against Chicago
police officers. “Upon receiving a citizen complaint, the Chicago Police
Department generally creates records cataloging the investigation into any
officer’s alleged misconduct. The CR files consist of the complaint itself and
documents created during the investigation of the complaint.”[75] The
Tribune and the Sun-Times requested that the lists include the name of
each officer against whom one or more CRs was filed, as well as the officer’s
date of appointment, the complaint category, the complaint number, the
incident date, the date of the complaint, the date the complaint was closed,
the final finding of the investigation, and any action taken.
2.

The Litigation
a. The Preliminary Injunction

The FOP filed suit to enjoin the release of the requested information. One
of the counts alleged that the release of the requested information would
interfere with FOP’s ability to seek redress in a pending arbitration
regarding the City’s alleged breach of section 8.4 of the collective
bargaining agreement which, FOP alleged, requires destruction of records
of alleged misconduct that are more than five years old or, in cases
involving allegations of criminal conduct or excessive force, more than
seven years old. The union also asserted that defendants violated the
IPLRA by unilaterally changing the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. The circuit court allowed the unions representing higherranking Chicago Police Department members (Chicago Police Sergeants
Association, PBPA Unit 156A; Chicago Police Lieutenants Association,
PBPA Unit 156B; and Chicago Police Captains Association, PBPA Unit
156C) to intervene as plaintiffs. The City, joined by the Chicago Tribune,
moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that FOP was not entitled to
injunctive relief because it had no likelihood of success on the merits. The
court denied the motion to dismiss and granted preliminary injunctive
relief on those claims pending the arbitration. The City, Chicago Police
Department, and the Tribune appealed from the entry of the preliminary
injunction.
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b. The FOP Arbitration

In addition to the injunction it filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, the
FOP filed two grievances claiming that the City had violated the collective
bargaining agreement by releasing disciplinary records that should have
been destroyed after five years pursuant to Section 8.4 of the collective
bargaining agreement.[76] On its face, Section 8.4 is the direct opposite of
transparency because it provides for the destruction of documents related
to the investigation and discipline of police officers, including the
investigation of complaints involving their use of excessive and/or deadly
force against citizens of the City. Complaints against a police officer are
virtually obscured from the public which is contrary to the transparency
goals embedded in FOIA.
These grievances were submitted to Arbitrator George Roumell, who
presided over the arbitration, and issued four awards[77] on these
grievances, beginning in January 2016, with his interim award sustaining
the grievances and directing the parties to negotiate a timeline for
destruction of the documents older than five years old.[78] Pursuant to the
terms of the interim award, the City and the FOP met but were unable to
identify records[79] to be destroyed or agree upon a timeline.[80]
Prior to the issuance of the final award, the City informed Arbitrator
Roumell that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) had initiated an
investigation of the Chicago Police Department and that the DOJ requested
that all relevant documents, including disciplinary and investigative
records, be preserved.[81] The City also informed Arbitrator Roumell that a
different arbitrator, Arbitrator Jules Crystal, had issued a final award in an
arbitration regarding a similar provision in the contract involving Chicago
Police Sergeants, and had found the provision to be a violation of public
policy.[82]
On April 28, 2016, Arbitrator Roumell issued a Final Award regarding the
grievances and found that state law did not warrant voiding the document
destruction provision, but did note that the DOJ request constituted a
sufficient public policy exception to preserve the documents for the time
being until the investigation and all resultant intervention and litigation
was concluded.[83] Arbitrator Roumell clarified this award on June 21,
2016, by stating that “the destruction of records pursuant to the language of
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Section 8.4 is there to be read and applied once the public policy exception
brought by the Department of Justice investigation and its possible
consequences no longer exists.”[84]
c. The PBPA Arbitration

Similar to the grievances filed by the FOP, the PBPA (representing in three
separate collective bargaining units sergeants, lieutenants and captains in
the Chicago Police Department) filed several grievances as well on the
grounds that Section 8.4 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement was
violated because the City failed to destroy the disciplinary histories and
complaint histories of every sergeant, lieutenant and captain. As Arbitrator
Crystal recited in his award, “The City - relying on the same contract
provision, together with the parties’ bargaining history, its legal obligation
requiring that it comply with external law and court orders, the Union’s
acquiescence to the Department’s practice, and the Association’s failure to
show that its actions has harmed any of its members -- contended that the
Grievance was without merit and should be dismissed in its entirety.”[85]
Following the submission of briefs, Arbitrator Crystal issued his award and
determined that the City violated the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement when it failed to purge CR and disciplinary records from its
online file system.[86] However, unlike the broad remedy sought by the
Union, i.e., the destruction of the records, Arbitrator Crystal directed that
the City comply with the express terms and conditions (and exception) set
forth in Section 8.4, i.e. removal of the records from the City’s on-line file
system.[87] Shortly after the issuance of the award, the City filed a request
for clarification of the award with Arbitrator Crystal, explaining that recent
developments since the issuance of the award required a re-assessment of
the remedy.[88]
Arbitrator Crystal issued a new award and wrote that the provision in the
sergeants’ contract was in “direct contravention of what has become a clear
and predominant public policy – a public policy that has been embraced by
recent judicial pronouncements and mirrored in the language of existing
legislation. With respect to the latter, the language of FOIA, the Public
Records Act and the Local Records Act supports the trend towards
disclosure.”[89]
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d. The First District Appellate Court Decision

On appeal, The First District Appellate Court vacated the preliminary
injunction that the Circuit Court of Cook County had entered to preserve
the status quo to allow the arbitrators to determine if the City breached
section 8.4 of the collective bargaining agreements by continuing to retain
CR files and disclose them pursuant to FOIA. [90] The First District held
that the remedy the FOP sought - to have the arbitrators order the City to
“comply with Section 8.4 by destroying records more than five years old
forthwith”[91] – was not enforceable because it precluded the City from
complying with pending FOIA requests.[92] The First District explained
that enforcement of an arbitration award requiring destruction of the
requested records would violate FOIA as well as the public policy
underlying the General Assembly’s adoption of the Act.[93] ¶
With respect to collective bargaining obligations, the First District stated:
In light of these public policy considerations and the purpose of the FOIA to open
governmental records to the light of public scrutiny, an award in the pending
arbitration proceedings would be unenforceable if it circumvented the City’s
required compliance with the FOIA requests at issue. Although arbitration is a
favored method of dispute resolution in both Illinois and federal courts, an
arbitration award may not stand if it results in the contravention of paramount
considerations of public policy.[94]

Because the circuit court identified no exemption that would permit denial
of the FOIA requests at issue, the First District found there was no breach
of a collective bargaining agreement and that no such exemption exists.[95]
The First District concluded that there was no legal basis for the circuit
court to enjoin the City from releasing the requested records to allow FOP
to pursue a legally unenforceable remedy at arbitration.
E.

City of Chicago v. CNN and Chicago Tribune v. City of Chicago:
FOIA Requests For Police Officers’ Private Emails

Last January, a CNN producer filed a request for information with the
Chicago Police Department that sought “all emails related to Laquan

SUMMER 2017 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

21

McDonald from Police Department email accounts and personal email
accounts where business was discussed” for twelve Chicago police
officers.[96] Similarly, the Chicago Tribune filed a lawsuit making parallel
allegations that the Chicago Police Department violated FOIA by failing to
produce requested emails relating to the Laquan McDonald shooting.[97]
CNN filed a request for review with the PAC, which in Opinion 16-006,
ruled in favor of disclosure
The City filed a petition for administrative review of PAC Opinion 16-006
alleging that the opinion was erroneous as a matter of law regarding the
City's FOIA obligations with respect to emails of individual officer
employees contained on their privately-owned, personal email
accounts.[98] The City maintained that the opinion incorrectly construed
the definition of "public records" in section 2(c) of FOIA and incorrectly
applied that definition in concluding that the emails sought on individual
officer employees' privately-owned, personal email accounts are "public
records."[99]
The City argued that the PAC Opinion “incorrectly equates an individual
officer employee with a ‘public body subject to the requirements of FOIA,’
... . . and incorrectly concludes that individual officer employees
communicating on private email accounts are transacting business as a
‘public body,’ as defined in section 2(a) of FOIA.”[100]
The City also alleged that the PAC Opinion was contrary to FOIA in three
other areas. First, the PAC Opinion was overly broad in a practical sense
because it sought to impose on the City a requirement to search not just the
personal emails of all City employees but also personal devices of all City
employees.[101] Second, the PAC Opinion wrongly interfered with FOIA’s
personal privacy protections because it impermissibly required the City to
search private emails.[102] And third, compliance with the PAC Opinion
would enlarge the scope of FOIA and diminish the intent of the General
Assembly’s construction of FOIA.[103]
The PAC Opinion, the City maintained, was also contrary to law because it
imposed an obligation on the City—to search for records on privatelyowned, personal email accounts not under the City's control—that FOIA
does not impose. This obligation is also incompatible with the structure of
FOIA, which contains no mechanism by which a public body can force its
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employees to grant it access to their personal email accounts at all, much
less within the five-business-day period in which public bodies must
respond to a FOIA request.[104] The Chicago Tribune also filed a lawsuit
alleging that its FOIA request for emails related to the LaQuan McDonald
shooting was improperly denied.[105] The City had responded to the
Tribune’s FOIA request that the request was unduly burdensome.[106] The
Tribune alleged that on March 22, 2016, the Chicago Police Department
promised to produce emails, but failed to do so.[107] The complaint
further alleged that the denial was retaliatory against the Tribune reporter
who submitted the request as she had previously been involved in a
separate lawsuit by the Tribune against the Chicago Police
Department.[108] The case is currently pending in the Circuit Court of
Cook County.
F.

PBPA v. City of Springfield: FOIA For Police Officer Misconduct
Complaints

Similar to the FOP and PBPA cases involving the City of Chicago’s
obligation to destroy files pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, in
Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 5 v. City of Springfield, the
Circuit Court of Sangamon County held that the City of Springfield’s failure
to destroy closed internal affairs files, as allegedly was required by a
collective bargaining agreement between Springfield and its police union,
“has no effect on whether or not they are subject to the Freedom of
Information Act.”[109] Despite the union’s insistence that the collective
bargaining agreement superseded FOIA, the court confirmed that that
parties are not permitted to circumvent state law by negotiating around
it.[110] To do so is contrary to both Section 15 of the IPLRA and Section 1
of FOIA.[111] In other words, Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No.
5 holds that parties may not bargain away FOIA’s disclosure
requirements.[112] Moreover, the court reasoned, any claim that privacy is
implicated by disclosure is controverted by the provision within FOIA that
permits redaction of certain information. Police Benevolent & Protective
Ass’n Unit No. 5 correctly notes that FOIA includes protections which
prevent potential irreparable harm by the release of CR files, including the
deletion of all personal and private information, such as addresses and
Social Security numbers.[113]
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G.

City of San Jose v. Superior Court: FOIA Request For Employees
Private Emails, Text Messages And Voicemails

Although not an Illinois decision, the California Supreme Court’s recent
ruling about private emails in furtherance of public business is instructive.
In City of San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, the state's
high court considered whether records concerning the conduct of public
business were beyond the reach of the California Public Records Act merely
because they were sent or received using a nongovernmental account.[114]
The case arose when an individual sought records from the City of San
Jose's redevelopment agency, the agency’s executive director and certain
elected officials.[115] The City produced the documents from official phone
numbers and email accounts, but did not provide information stored on the
officials' personal accounts.[116] Considering the statute's language and the
public policy interests it serves, the court concluded that communications
about public business may be subject to the California Public Records Act
(“CPRA”) regardless of the account used in their preparation or
transmission.[117] The California Supreme Court reversed the California
Court of Appeal which had held that:
the language of the CPRA does not afford a construction that imposes on the City
an affirmative duty to produce messages stored on personal electronic devices
and accounts that are inaccessible to the agency, or to search those devices and
accounts of its employees and officials upon a CPRA request for messages
relating to City business. Whether such a duty better serves public policy is a
matter for the Legislature, not the courts, to decide.[118]

The California Supreme Court analyzed the four elements of a public
record. The California Public Records Act defines a public record as: “(1) a
writing, (2) with content relating to the conduct of the public's business,
which is (3) prepared by, or (4) owned, used, or retained by any state or
local agency.”[119] The court confirmed that emails, text messages, and
other electronic platforms are "writings" under the California Public
Records Act.[120] As to the second element, the court concluded that "a
writing must relate in some substantive way to the conduct of the public's
business."[121] In evaluating the third and fourth elements, which require
that a writing be "prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local
agency," the court focused on the term "or."[122] The court noted that
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agencies operate through officers and employees who "prepare" records
relating to official business. As such, records prepared by officers and
employees are public if they are in the "agency's actual or constructive
possession." [123]
H.

Cooper v. Glenn Ellyn School District 41: FOIA Requests For
Teachers Union Emails

In October 2016, FOIA litigation involving Glen Ellyn School District 41
concluded when a Du Page County Circuit Court judge ordered the District
to turn over certain emails generated by members of the Glen Ellyn
Education Association (“GEEA”) that related to GEEA’s efforts to form “an
informal committee comprised of teachers from various schools in the
District, who screen, vet, and recommend candidates for the District’s
School Board.”[124]
I.

City of Ontario v. Quon: Private Messages Made on EmployerIssued Devices

In the face of continuous technological change over the past two-plus
decades, the Supreme Court revisited employee workplace privacy issues in
its 2010 decision, City of Ontario v. Quon.[125] At issue in Quon was the
City of Ontario Police Department’s search of its employee’s text messages
on his employer-issued pager.[126] Quon had been warned that the City
had a policy under which it reserved the right to monitor and log all
network activity, including text messages, email and internet use, with or
without notice to employees.[127] The policy further stated that “users
should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these
resources.”[128]
After Quon exceeded his set monthly text allowance multiple times, his
supervisor requested transcripts of the texts to determine whether the
overages were occurring as a result of Quon’s personal use of the pager, as
opposed to proper work-related use.[129] The resulting search revealed
personal messages to Quon’s wife and an alleged mistress. [130]
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After learning that the city had searched his text messages, Quon sued the
City of Ontario, alleging that the search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights, the Stored Communications Act, and other state laws.[131] A federal
district court determined that while Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the content of his text messages, the City of Ontario had a
legitimate purpose for undertaking the search.[132] The Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that even if the search was conducted for a legitimate
reason, it was unreasonable in scope because the City of Ontario failed to
use less intrusive means.[133]
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and
found that the scope of the City’s search was indeed reasonable.[134] In so
finding, the Court noted as a preliminary matter that employers are not
required to use the “least intrusive search practicable” under the Fourth
Amendment.[135] Next, the Court found that the scope of the search was
reasonable because, among other things, the employer limited the search to
two months of text messages and excluded from the search any text
messages sent outside work hours, demonstrating that the employer was
trying not to intrude on Quon’s personal privacy. [136]
Just as important as what the Court ruled upon, however, was what the
Court specifically declined to address. The Court declined to address the
first of the principles it had established in O’Connor v. Ortega,[137] i.e.
whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages.[138] Because the Court found that the second prong of O’Connor
was satisfied (the purpose of the search was legitimate at its inception, and
the scope was reasonably related to the employer’s objectives), the search
was valid regardless of whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his texts.[139] The Court explained its hesitation to create a firm
rule regarding an employee’s expectation of privacy in text messages:
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. . .
. Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission
are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper
behavior. . . . At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s
treatment of them, will evolve. . . . A broad holding concerning employees’
privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might
have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.[140]
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With that, the Supreme Court effectively confirmed that a public
employee’s expectation of privacy in communications on employer-issued
technology will depend in large part upon employer policies and practices
and regulation for legitimate purposes.
J.

Additional Lower Court Cases Impacting Employee Privacy

While public employees’ expectations of privacy can be dimished or
expanded by “the operational realities of the workplace,”[141] lower courts
have often been divided with respect to what privacy, if any, a public
employee can expect in the workplace. For example, in Leventhal v.
Knapek, the Second Circuit found that a public employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his work computer and matters contained therein
despite the employer’s official policy prohibiting the use of state equipment
for personal business.[142] The court noted that the employee did not share
his computer with anyone, there was no general practice of the public
employer to routinely search employee computers, and the employer had
not made clear that employees lacked privacy rights in what was stored in
the computers.[143] Importantly, the court’s decision emphasized that the
employer’s practice was determinative. [144]
In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications with her lawyer via a personal, password-protected email
account, even if accessed on an employer-issued computer.[145] In addition
to preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege, the court found
that Stengart had a subjective expectation of privacy because she took steps
to protect her emails, sending them from her personal, password-protected
account and not saving her password to the employer-issued
computer.[146] Also importantly, the court concluded that the employer’s
email policy was unclear and permitted “occasional personal use,” thereby
creating ambiguity as to whether personal email was employer or private
property.[147] In holding that Stengart had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the employer’s practice
as a proxy for an explicit policy.[148]
By contrast, where there are clear, explicit, and reasonable policies, some
courts have declined to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in
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employee emails and other documents and records created on employerissued technology. For instance, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v.
Simmons[149] that a government employee lacked a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the files he downloaded from the Internet because of a
workplace policy. In a routine security check of the workplace firewall
protection, the employer discovered Simmons had downloaded material
unrelated to government business despite an explicit policy stating the
employer would audit or monitor “all file transfers, all websites visited, and
all e-mail messages.”[150]
In Biby v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,[151] the Eighth
Circuit reviewed a case in which the public university employer had a policy
informing computer users “not to expect privacy if the university has a
legitimate reason to conduct a search,” specifically including searches
“responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation.”[152] The
University sought to produce files from Biby’s computer in response to a
discovery request, and Biby claimed the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. [153] In light of the policy, the court found that Biby
failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer
files.[154] The lesson of Biby is that a well-balanced policy provides an
employer with greater leverage to conduct a search, especially in the
context of litigation.
The Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Angevine, that a public
university professor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
pornographic files stored on his computer.[155] The university’s computer
policy stated, “The contents of all storage media owned or stored on
University computing facilities are the property of [the] University,” and
noted that “the University reserves the right to view or scan any file or
software stored on the computer or passing through the network, and will
do so periodically . . . to audit the use of University resources.”[156]
In short, and irrespective of the technology, these decisions confirm that
where there is an explicit policy setting forth terms under which technology
and facilities are monitored, the balancing of privacy interests weighs
heavily in favor of the employer.
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IV.

THE COLLISION BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING OBLIGATIONS: TAKEAWAYS FROM THE REPORTED CASES
AND ARBITRATION AWARDS

The confluence of FOIA requests and media scrutiny in all aspects of
government affairs focused heavily on employee information renders the
importance of workplace privacy even more timely. While there is a high
value placed on privacy, actual protection in the workplace is limited.
Legitimate employer interests and rigid transparency laws generally justify
intrusions on employee privacy. Public employee laptops, smart phones,
and mobile devices – employer-issued or personal – allow employees to
work from the road or from home, creating confusion and uncertainty
about the scope of privacy related to both personal and workplace
communications. This new reality makes it more challenging to determine
the scope of privacy in the workplace. Despite the legitimacy of employer
motives[157] and mandate to comply with FOIA, however, employer
practices can certainly intrude on employee privacy interests, especially
when it comes to private email and text messages. Public sector employees
have an interest in protecting and controlling the use of personal
information about them.
These privacy interests clash with legitimate employer interests to comply
with FOIA. In wake of the above-discussed case law and arbitration awards,
the following are takeaways for employers and employees when it comes to
disclosure requirements under FOIA that conflict with collective bargaining
obligations and employee privacy interests.
A.

Arbitration Awards Favor Disclosure Over Privacy Protections
Within Collective Bargaining Agreements

In light of the follow-up arbitration awards issued by Arbitrators Roumell
and Crystal, it is likely that FOIA will generally trump any collective
bargaining provision aimed at protecting employee privacy. It is now
settled that CR files and complaint register histories generally are not
exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s Section 7. Moreover, those cases
made clear that FOIA contains no exemption for documents that should
have been destroyed (whether by operation of law or contract) but were
not. Nor does FOIA exempt records that are subject to the terms of a
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collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, even if the Chicago Police
Department was required under section 8.4 of the collective bargaining
agreement to destroy the CRs, the Chicago Police Department was required
to produce them because they existed at the time the FOIA requests were
submitted and there is no exception barring their production.
B.

Public Policy Favors Disclosure Over Collective Bargaining
Obligations

Section 1 of FOIA declares it to be the “public policy of the State of Illinois
that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the
affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who
represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the
terms of this Act.”[158] To that end, any agreement to exempt information
from the ambit of disclosure under FOIA would not be binding. A contract
provision that violates public policy as expressed in a statute is
unenforceable.[159]
Thus, interpretations of collective bargaining
provisions that would permit a public sector employer to circumvent the
public policy effectuated by FOIA would be unenforceable.
C.

FOIA Will Supersede the IPLRA

Moreover, FOIA is a state statute; therefore, the parties may not
contractually agree to remove any documents from the ambit of disclosure
under FOIA. FOIA does not provide that it is subordinate to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. Section 15(b) of the
IPLRA provides, in pertinent part, that “any collective bargaining contract
between a public employer and a labor organization executed pursuant to
this Act shall supersede any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or
regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and
employment relations adopted by the public employer or its agents.”[160]
Thus, although a collective bargaining agreement can trump certain laws, it
takes precedence only over a law that is adopted by the public employer
itself.[161] In other words, because FOIA is a state law that generally does
not trigger issues related to unionized employees’ wages, hours, or working
conditions, collective bargaining agreements will not supplant FOIA’s
transparency aim.
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D.

Only Heads of Public Bodies Will be Compelled to Turn Over
Personal Emails Issued from Private Accounts and/or Devices

Most recently, Mayor Rahm Emanuel has been sued by the Better
Government Association over emails maintained on a personal server as
well as by the Chicago Tribune for refusing to release emails and text
messages about city business conducted using his personal devices.[162]
Mayor Emanuel resolved the case involving the Better Government
Association, agreeing to turn over roughly 2,700 emails regarding City
business on his personal email account. In doing so, Mayor Emanuel was
able to pick and choose what emails he would disclose and avoid having the
judge compel him to turn over all of his personal emails.[163]
But individual employees who use private devices to conduct government
business are unlikely to be sued or even compelled to disclose private
emails or text messages. Given the structure of FOIA, if public officials
conduct government business using private devices or private email
accounts, they are likely to have to turn over emails pursuant to a FOIA
request. That is because the general perception of a public employee does
not fit into the definition of “public body” as defined by Section 2(a) of
FOIA.[164] In fact, FOIA defines “Head of the public body” as “the
president, mayor, chairman, presiding officer, director, superintendent,
manager, supervisor or individual otherwise holding primary executive and
administrative authority for the public body, or such person's duly
authorized designee.”[165] It seems when the air is finally cleared in the
litigation, employees will not be compelled[166] to turn over private emails
or text message issued on private devices because they do not constitute the
“head of the public body.”
E.

1.

Disclosure of Personal Emails from Private Accounts May be
Barred by Federal Law and the Fourth Amendment
The Stored Communication Act

The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), a federal statute may also
prohibit disclosure of an employee’s personal emails issued from private
devices. The SCA is a federal statute with two principle aims: (1) it protects
personal information stored by electronic communication service providers
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from disclosing a person’s electronic communications;[167] and (2) it sets
forth the procedures by which law enforcement can compel electronic
communications service providers to disclose such personal electronic
communications.[168] Because FOIA requests for employee’s personal
emails are generally stored by electronic communication service providers,
unless the employee voluntarily agrees, employers will be hard-pressed to
compel disclosure due to the constraints posed by the SCA.
Indeed, if a FOIA request seeks government emails that are maintained by
an electronic communication service provider, the SCA does not necessarily
prohibit disclosure. In Flagg v. City of Detroit[169] a wrongful death
lawsuit brought against the Mayor of the City of Detroit, his chief of staff,
and other city officials, the plaintiff’s sought in discovery City of Detroit text
messages that were stored by SkyTel, a non-party electronic service
provider. The City objected to the discovery request on the basis that (1) the
text messages were private; and (2) the SCA prohibits disclosure of the
requested text messages in civil litigation because they were stored by a
non-party service provider.[170] The court rejected the City’s objection
reasoning that the City itself had control of the text messages stating, “If the
City can block the disclosure of SkyTel messages by withholding its consent, it
surely follows that it can permit the disclosure of these communications
by granting its consent. This acknowledged power readily qualifies as a ‘legal
right to obtain’ the messages held by SkyTel, and hence constitutes ‘control’
within the meaning of Rule 34(a)(1).”[171] The court further rejected the
City’s privacy arguments because the Mayor signed off on a city policy that
put employees on notice that text messages and emails were the property of
the City and could be subject to disclosure[172].
Unlike Flagg v. City of Detroit, neither CNN nor the Chicago Tribune are
likely to be able to obtain disclosure of the personal emails of Chicago
police officers issued on private accounts because they are not within the
control of the City. It is also unlikely that the electronic communication
service providers could be compelled to turn over those emails due to the
protections detailed in the SCA.
2.

The Fourth Amendment

In addition to the SCA, FOIA requests for personal emails issued on private
accounts will certainly press the question of whether the Fourth
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Amendment protects against employer-acquisition of such electronic
information. Private devices have become “such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they
were an important feature of human anatomy.”[173] The U.S. Supreme
Court made clear in Riley v. California that private devices contain a
treasure trove of personal information particularly the “sum of an
individual’s private life” that there must be a reasonable expectation of
privacy.[174] Public sector employees who use private devices to send
personal emails or text messages certainly would enjoy that same
expectation of privacy.[175] In determining whether an individual has an
expectation of privacy in information held by a third party, such as an
electronic communications provider, factors generally considered are
whether the information was “voluntarily conveyed” and what privacy
interest a person has in the information[176].
The conclusion that public sector employees enjoy a reasonable expectation
of privacy in personal emails issued on private devices is likely given the
other contexts in which a privacy interest has been found. In addition,
while a public sector employee may have voluntarily conveyed information,
e.g., an email on Google Mail, there is a certain privacy interest in that
information. For example, an email or text to a significant other may reveal
intimate details always intended to be private. In another way, an email
about a family issue or medical condition would certainly entail sensitive
information that is exceedingly private. FOIA requests for personal emails
are surely going to implicate the expectation of privacy in information.
FOIA was never intended to enlarge its reach in such a way, and therefore,
the privacy interests are likely to outweigh the need for transparency.
F.

Invoking the Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy Exemption in
FOIA is Generally Inapplicable When the Information Sought
Pertains to Employment Duties

While society generally places a high value on privacy, actual protection in
the workplace is limited. Legitimate employer interests generally justify
intrusions on employee privacy.[177] A FOIA request could be construed as
such a legitimate intrusion. Notwithstanding, FOIA does contain an
exemption for records that, if disclosed, would result in a “clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”[178] Section 7(c) provides that
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an “’[u]nwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ means the “disclosure of
information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person
and in which the subject’s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public
interest in obtaining the information.”[179] The same section further
provides that “[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public
duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an
invasion of personal privacy.”[180] Even if the information within a public
record may be highly personal and embarrassing, as long as it relates to the
public duties of an employee or official, use of this exemption will not be
allowed.
G.

Proposal to Make Private Emails Subject to Disclosure Under
FOIA

As a reaction to the ambiguity of FOIA as applied to private devices, the
Fourth District in City of Champaign v. Madigan strongly emphasized the
need for legislative action regarding electronic communications and public
record laws.[181] The Fourth District stated that it “[encouraged] local
municipalities to consider promulgating their own rules prohibiting city
council members from using their personal electronic devices during city
council meetings.”[182]
Several years after the Fourth District’s
proclamation, Senate Bill 1977 has been introduced to amend FOIA to
modify the definition of “public records.”[183] The change is:
(c) “Public records” means all … electronic communications, recorded
information and all other documentary materials pertaining to the transaction of
public business, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been
prepared by or for the public body , or having been or being used by, received by,
in the possession of, or under the control of any public body. [184]

This new legislative proposal appears to be an immediate reaction to avoid
the uncertainty of FOIA as it relates to private email and text messages, but
also a measure to bring clarity in light of Champaign v. Madigan and PAC
Opinions 11-006 and 16-006. There is one glaring problem with the
proposed legislation. If the public body has never received the particular
record, complying with a FOIA request for that record could be difficult. In
the same way the Chicago Police Department was challenged by the request
from the Chicago Tribune and CNN, emails or text messages on a public
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official or employee's private device are not readily available to the public
body, making it difficult, if not impossible to comply with a FOIA request.
In addition, House Bill 2385 would amend the Local Records Act to
expressly provide that all emails sent or received by a government agency,
officer, employee, or contractor are public records "regardless of whether
the email is sent or received on a personal or agency-provided email
address." [185] The bill also includes the following requirements:


Agencies must provide official email addresses to all officers of the agency
if employees are provided with an official email address.



All officers, employees, and contractors are required to use the official
email address “for all communications in connection with the transaction
of public business.”



All officers, employees, and contractors must forward any email sent or
received on their personal email addresses to their agency-provided email
if it relates to agency business or, if the agency does not have an official
email account, then provide a copy of the email to the agency.

The proposed legislation only amends the Local Records Act and does not
address whether these records are subject to FOIA, which has a different
definition of “public record.”[186] House Bill 2385 is also problematic
because it relates only to emails and does not include text messages. The
continued confusion makes clear that new legislation is needed to put not
only public officials on notice as to what, if any, information procured on a
personal device is subject to disclosure, but also public sector employees.
Until the General Assembly addresses all forms of electronic
communication – emails, text messages, messages sent using social media
or other applications – confusion will continue and public sector employers
and employees will not know whether communications on their private
devices are fair game for FOIA disclosure.
V.

CONCLUSION: BEST PRACTICES FOR MOVING FORWARD

The intermingling of public duties on private devices or accounts, together
with shifting notions of personal privacy, have generated considerable
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attention about the boundaries of the law. What is clear is that despite these
technological challenges, it is the public body’s obligation to abide by the
express terms of FOIA. This new reality makes it more challenging to
determine the scope of privacy in the workplace. The following constitute a
snapshot of best practices to employ in order to avoid blurring privacy lines
even more.
It is a bad practice for public sector employers to permit officials and
employees to use private devices or private accounts to conduct public
business. In the event of a FOIA request, it will be necessary to cull through
all such private devices or accounts to retrieve responsive communications.
Use of private devices or private accounts is likely to make retrieval
cumbersome and time consuming. Emails, text messages and other
electronic communications sent to or from a public official’s or employee’s
private account, or on a privately-owned device, will be subject to
disclosure under FOIA depending on the content or context of the
communication. If the public body receives a FOIA request asking for
private device or account information, the involved public official or
employee will be subject to a search of the account or device. Should
litigation arise over questions regarding whether the FOIA request was
thoroughly responded to, it is possible that a court could require an actual
search of the device or account by a third party. In the wake of these issues,
PAC opinions, and court decisions, the likely consequence is that public
sector employers will create policies that mandate public officials and
employees use their official agency accounts for all business related
communications.
To the extent that public officials or employees continue to maintain private
accounts or use private devices in the conduct of public business, it would
be good practice to forward all business-related texts or emails to
recognized public employer accounts for ease of search or access in the
event of a FOIA request. Texts sent or received on a private device during
the course of a public meeting which involve public business would be
subject to disclosure if a FOIA request were made, unless the
communication is otherwise exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
In the case of a communication involving both public business and private
matters, it would be permissible to redact the private portions of the
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communication before producing the public portions. If a communication
maintained on a private device or in a private account involves public
business it is likely that a court would rule that it must be disclosed unless
an exception already recognized under the law exists (e.g., attorney-client
communication).
In sum, the case law, PAC opinions, and FOIA establish that privacy
expectations in the workplace are no longer secure and vary in significant
ways depending on whether public business was transacted. It is incumbent
upon public sector employers to establish policies prohibiting public
officials and employees from using private devices to conduct public
business in order to make certain government communications will be
preserved and accessible while also protecting privacy public officials may
have in the communications made on private devices.
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[1] See Sam Charles, City Seeks to Keep Cops’ Personal Emails About McDonald
Private, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016, 07:34 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.
com/politics/city-seeks-to-keep-cops-personal-emails-mcdonald-private/.
[2] In Toensing v. Attorney General of Vermont, the Vermont Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in a legal battle over how — and when — the state Public Records Act
applies to personal emails, text messages or other forms of communication. The case
originated when in June 2016, the Vermont Republican Party vice chair sued the thenattorney general, a Democrat, after he refused to search for and turn over public records
stored on his personal accounts that might be pertinent to the records request. Citing
privacy concerns, the Vermont Superior Court sided with the Attorney General's Office,
Toensing v. Attorney Gen’l of Vt., Docket No. 500-6-16 Cncv, slip. op. at 3 (Vt. Super.
Ct. Feb. 8, 2017),available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3673980/
Printed-Case-Toensing-v-OAG-Optimized.pdf, but also raised the "seriously, and,
frankly, disturbing concern" that the ruling would allow public officials to circumvent
the public records act by doing government business through personal accounts. Id. at
7. That decision was appealed, and the Vermont Supreme Court held oral arguments
June 7, 2017. Vt. Sup. Ct., Hearing Calendar, June Term 2017, https://www.vermont
judiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/June%202017%20Term.Public.Rev_.%20J
une%205_0.pdf.
[3] In West v. Vermillion, 384 P.3d 634 (Wash. App. 2016), rev. denied, 390 P.3d 339
(Wash. 2016), cert. filed No. 17-15 (June 6, 2017), Vermillion set up his own personal
website and email address to use in conjunction with his state congressional run. He
later used the website and email account in connection with a successful campaign for a
seat on the Puyallup City Council. West submitted a public records act request for,
among other things, emails on Vermillion’s private account pertaining to Puyallup city
business. The Washington Court of Appeals ruled that (1) the Fourth Amendment’s
protections against search and seizure were not implicated because the City
Councilman had no reasonable expectation of privacy in communications “related to
the public’s business”; (2) the privacy protections under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution did not apply because West was not seeking private
information; (3) the First Amendment was not implicated because West was not
asking for political activity records; (4) Vermillion was not subject to the City’s
policy prohibiting City employees and volunteers from performing city business on
personal or third-party “technology resource[s],” which include electronic or digital
communications and commingling of City and non-City data files; and (5) the public
has a right to inspect public records located on a personal computer unless the
records are “highly offensive to a reasonable person and are not of legitimate public
concern.” Id. at 635-36. The superior court then ordered Vermillion “under penalty
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of perjury [to] produce records that are within the scope of [p]laintiff ’s records
request.” Id.
[4] See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 389 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2017) (holding that use of
a private account by city employee to communicate about city business subjects the
communications to the California Public Records Act).
[5] The University of Oregon recently encountered two unprecedented high- publicity
crises with its employees. The first case involved a law professor who donned a
Halloween costume that included blackface for a party at her house. See Scott Jaschik,
Oregon: Professor in Blackface Violated Anti-Harassment Policy, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/03/university-oregonfinds-professor-who-wore-blackface-party-violated-anti-harassment. The second case
involved an assistant football coach who was arrested on drunken driving charges. See
Oregon Assistant Football Coach to be Fired after DUI Arrest, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2017,
2:49 p.m.), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-colleges-oregon-assist
ant-coach-arrested-spt-20170122-story.htmlThe University took disciplinary action on
both the law professor and assistant coach, but details remained confidential because
Oregon law prohibits the release of disciplinary records to the public.
[6] 5 ILCS 140.
[7] See Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 482, 322 N.E.2d 20, 25 (1974);City of
Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662 ¶42, 992 N.E.2d 629, 639 ; Day v.
City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73, 902 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (1st Dist. 2009); Copley
Press Inc. v. City of Springfield, 143 Ill. App. 3d 370, 376, 493 N.E.2d 127, 129 (4th Dist.
1986).
[8] Following a series of FOIA requests, investigative reporters for the Chicago Tribune
discovered City of Chicago Water Department employees had sent volumes of
derogatory and racist emails using the City’s email account. These emails are obviously
fair game and subject to disclosure under FOIA. Those emails also revealed that an
employee with the State of Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission was also a party
to the racist, derogatory email exchanges. However, the State of Illinois employee used a
private email account to send and respond to the emails. The Chicago Tribune reported
that “Even though [the State of Illinois employee] didn't use his government email
address, Chad Fornoff, executive director of the state Executive Ethics Commission, said
that this type of matter should be referred to the executive inspector general for
investigation into whether any violations of state law, rules or policies have occurred,
including conduct unbecoming a state employee.” See Ray Long & Todd Lighty, Racist
Emails Scandal Moves Beyond Chicago As Illinois Opens Investigation Into State
Employee's Role, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/politics/ct-chicago-water-department-emails-capuzi-20170724-story.html.
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[9] See City of Champaign, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662 at ¶¶ 41, 42, 992 N.E.2d at 639;
Illinois Attorney General Public Access Counselor Opinion No. 11-006 (Nov. 15, 2011),
available at http://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/opinions/2011/11-006.pdf; Illinois
Attorney General Public Access Counselor Opinion No. 16-006 (Aug. 9, 2016), available
at http://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/opinions/2016/16-006.pdf.
[10] See Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 Ill.
App. (1s.t ) 143884, ¶ 32, 59 N.E.3d 96, 04 (“Enforcement of an arbitration award
requiring destruction of the requested records on the ground that the City breached
section 8.4 of the CBA would violate the FOIA as well as the public policy underlying the
General Assembly’s adoption of the Act.”).
[11] 5 ILCS 140/1 et. seq.
[12] Id. at 140/1.
[13] Id.
[14] Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 482, 322 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1974); see also
Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 143 Ill. App. 3d 370, 372, 493 N.E.2d 127, 128
(4th Dist. 1986).
[15] 5 ILCS140/1.2.
[16] Id. at 140/3(a).
[17] Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73, 902 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (1st Dist.
2009).
[18] 5 ILCS 140/7.
[19] Id. at 140/7.5.
[20] 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a). Disclosure Prohibited by Other Laws, Section 7(1)(a) of the Act
exempts information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or state law or
resolution. For example, certain student records are confidential under the Illinois
School Student Records Act.See 105 ILCS 10/6. A FOIA request for these confidential
student records can be denied under Section 7(1)(a), with a reference to the School
Student Records Act.
[21] 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b). Some documents in the possession of a public body may
contain personal information that is not appropriate for public purview. Under the new
provisions of FOIA, this information may be treated either as private information or
personal information. (1) Private Information Section 7(1)(b) exempts “private
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information” unless disclosure is required by another provision of FOIA, a state or
federal law or a court order. Private information is defined as: ”[U]nique identifiers,
including a person’s social security number, driver’s license number, employee
identification number, biometric identifiers, personal financial information, passwords
or other access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone numbers, and
personal email addresses. Private information also includes home address and personal
license plates, except as otherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility
of attribution to any person.” 5 ILCS 140/2(c-5). If information within a document
subject to a FOIA request meets the definition of “private information,” the public body
may redact the information utilizing this exemption.
[22] Id. at 140/7(1)(d). The exemption in Section 7(l)(d) provides protection against the
disclosure of investigatory records compiled for ordinance or administrative
enforcement and law enforcement purposes where the disclosure would interfere with
ongoing investigations, unavoidably disclose the identity of an informant, disclose
specialized investigative techniques, or cause other itemized harms.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at 140/7(1)(f). Section 7(l)(f) exempts “preliminary drafts, notes,
recommendations, memoranda and other records” in which opinions are expressed, or
policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion
thereof shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head
of the public body. The head of a public body is defined in Section 2(e) asvarious
individuals with primary executive and administrative authority for the public body.
Thus, unless the head of the governmental body, as previously defined, publicly
identifies and cites the preliminary material, it will not need to be made available for
inspection. The exemption is intended to protect and permit the free expression of ideas
in all sorts of reports prepared at all levels of local government. The pre-approval
requirement in the 2010 statute was repealed in 2011 and is no longer required. It
should still be noted, however, that simply referring to a record as a “draft,” or a
“recommendation,” is an insufficient basis to use this exception. If a record held out as a
preliminary draft is, in fact, part of a final document, it is subject to disclosure.
[25] Id. at 140/7(1)(g), 7(l)(h), 7(l)(i), 7(l)(k), 7(l)(p), 7(l)(r), and 7(l)(t). The exemptions
in Sections 7(l)(g), 7(l)(h), 7(l)(i), 7(l)(k), 7(l)(p), 7(l)(r), and 7(l)(t) all relate to quasicommercial, trade, technical or financial items, including documents pertaining to real
estate purchase negotiations. A public body is able to keep from the public certain
matters that would prevent them from effectively operating as a buyer or seller or user
of services in the marketplace where a trade partner or adversary is not required to
make such disclosure.
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[26] 5 ILCS 140/3.6(c).
[27].5 ILCS 140/2(c).
[28] See Chicago Tribune v. City of Chicago, 2016 CH 15960 (filed Dec. 9, 2016);
Chicago Tribune v. City of Chicago, 2016 CH 15731 (filed Dec. 5, 2016); City of Chicago
v. Illinois Attorney General and CNN, 2016 CH 12085 (filed Sept. 13, 2016).
[29] The Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) is an attorney in the Attorney General’s office
whose responsibility it is to ensure that public bodies comply with the FOIA and the
Open Meetings Act (“OMA”), 5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. The PAC works under the direction
and supervision of the Attorney General and oversees the Public Access Bureau in the
Attorney General’s office. 15 ILCS 205/7 Under both the FOIA and OMA, the Attorney
General, through the PAC, has several responsibilities, including: (1) to provide
electronic training to all FOIA officers and all persons designated by public bodies to
receive OMA training and to provide model policies to public bodies; (2) to provide
educational materials to the public and to respond to informal inquiries; (3) to issue
advisory opinions on FOIA and OMA in response to requests by public bodies; (4) to
work to resolve or mediate disputes between members of the public and public bodies
over FOIA and OMA; and (5) to investigate and issue opinions in response to Requests
for Review submitted by members of the public when a FOIA request has been denied
by a public body, 5 ILCS 140/9.5, or when it is alleged that a public body violated the
OMA. 5 ILCS 120/3.5.
[30] Ill. Att’y Gen. Public Access Counselor Opinion No. 11-006, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2011).
[31] Id. at 5-6
[32] Id.
[33] Id. at 5, 7.
[34] Id. at 5.
[35] City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662 at ¶¶ 41-42, 992
N.E.2d at 638-39.
[36] Illinois Attorney General Public Access Counselor Opinion No. 16-006 (Aug. 9,
2016).
[37] Id. at 5.
[38] Id. at 10.
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[39] Id. at 9.
[40] 5 ILCS 315.
[41] 5 ILCS 315/15.
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 315/15(a).
[44] Id. at 315/15(b).
[45] See, e.g. Majeske v. City of Chicago, No. 89 C 7262, 1998 WL 312016, at *4
(N.D.Ill. June 4, 1998); Brownlee v. City of Chicago, 983 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
[46] See 5 ILCS 315/15(b).
[47] FOP Chicago Lodge 7 and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement, 20122016.
[48] See FOP Chicago Lodge 7 and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement, §
8.4 (July 1, 2012- June 30, 2017), available at https://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA20122017_2.20.15.pdf.
[49] See PBPA – Unit 156 SGT and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement,
2012-2016; PBPA – Unit 156 LTS and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement,
2012-2016; PBPA – Unit 156 CPT and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement,
2012-2016.
[50] FOP Chicago Lodge 7 and City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Agreement, 20122017, § 6.8.
[51] Ann C. Hodges, Bargaining for Privacy in the Unionized WorkplaceI, 22 INT’L J.
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 147, 169 (citing Michael R. Triplett, Employee Tracking
Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee Backlash, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), Apr. 27, 2004, at C-1). “Another report indicates that after negotiations
the City of Orlando rejected the use of tracking devices, while the Teamsters and
UPS agreed to prohibit monitoring on employees' personal time.” Id. at 169 n. 144
(citing Employer Use of GPS Units in Work Vehicles, Cell Phones, Stirs Employee
Privacy Concerns' 42 Gov 't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 786 (Aug.t 17, 2004). The
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Teamsters have also barred use of GPS technology to study efficiency or set time
standards. Id.
[52] Id. at 167; see also City of Chicago and Unit II (SEIU Local 73 and IBEW Local 21)
Collective Bargaining Agreement, Jan. 1, 2011- June 30, 2016.
[53] Hodges, supra note 51, at 166; see also City of Chicago and Public Safety Employees
Unit II (SEIU Local 73 and IBEW Local 21) Collective Bargaining Agreement, Jan. 1,
2011- June 30, 2016.
[54] Hodges, supra note 51 at 169 (citing California State Employees Ass 'n v.
California Youth Authority, 23 PERC (LRP) ¶ 30114 (Cal. PERB ALJ 1999)).
[55] City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 Ill. App. (4th) 120662, ¶ 30, 992 N.E. 2d 629,
636.
[56] Id. ¶ 44, 992 N.E.2d at 640.
[57]. Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 5 v. City of Springfield, No. 13-CH904 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County Oct. 21, 2013).
[58] Id. at 1-2.
[59] Id.
[60] Id. at 2.
[61] Id. at 3.
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Id.
[65] 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, 7 N.E.3d 741. RLs were documents about officers who
amassed the most misconduct complaints. CRs were related to the Chicago Police
Department’s completed investigations into allegations of police misconduct.
[66] Kalven, 2014 IL App (1st) 121846 ¶ 19, 7 N.E.3d at 746 (quoting Stern v. WheatonWarrenville Community Unit School District 200, 233 Ill. 2d 396, 405, 910 N.E.2d 85,
91 (1999)).
[67] Id. at ¶ 29, 7 N.E.2d at 749.
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[68] Id. at ¶ 25, 7 N.E.3d at 748.
[69] Id. at ¶ 24, 7 N.E.3d at 748.
[70] Id. at ¶ 4, 7 N.E.3d at 743.
[71] Id. at ¶ 30, 7 N.E.2d at 749.
[72] CHICAGO POLICE BOARD, ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT: A GUIDE TO THE
COMPLAINT AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 1 (May 2015), available at https://www.
cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/PoliceDiscipline/AllegMiscond201505.p
df.
[73] Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 2-57-040 (2014).
[74] Kalven, 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶¶ 2-3, 7 N.E.3d at 742-43.
[75] Id. at ¶ 3, 7 N.E.3d at 743.
[76] The FOP filed two grievances relating to the City’s retention of these records:
Grievance No. 129-11-035, filed November 30, 2011, and Grievance No. 129-12-0041,
filed April 12, 2012. See Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of
Chicago I, Gr. Nos. 129-11-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Jan. 12, 2016).
[77] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago I (Interim
Award), Gr. Nos. 129-11-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Jan. 12, 2016) Fraternal
Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago II (Letter Award), Gr. Nos. 12911-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Mar. 4, 2016);Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago
Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago III (Final Award), Gr. Nos. 129-11-035 and 129-12-004
(Arb. Roumell, Apr. 28, 2016); Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of
Chicago IV (Order on Clarification), Gr. Nos. 129-11-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell,
June 21, 2016).
[78] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago I, Gr. Nos. 12911-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Jan. 12, 2016).
[79] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago III, Gr. Nos. 12911-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Apr. 28, 2016) at 10.
[80] Id.; See Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago II, Gr.
Nos. 129-11-035 and 129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Mar. 4, 2016) at 2-3, 5 and Fraternal
Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago III, Gr. Nos. 129-11-035 and
129-12-004 (Arb. Roumell, Apr. 28, 2016) at 5-6.
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[82] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago II.
[83] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago III.
[84] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago IV at 10-11.
[85] Police Benevolent Protective Association – Unit 156A, 156B, and 156C v. City of
Chicago, Gr. Nos. 14-001, 14-003, and 14-013, at 2 (Arb. Crystal, Feb. 29, 2016).
[86] Id. at 3-4.
[87] Id.
[88] Id. at 4-5.
[89] Id. at 16.
[90] Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App
(1st) 143884, 59 N.E.3d 96.
[91] Id. at ¶ 31, 59 N.E.3d at 104.
[92] Id. at ¶ 32, 59 N.E.3d at 104.
[93] Id. at ¶ 33, 59 N.E.3d at 104 citing Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill.App. 3d 70, 73,
902 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (1st Dist. 2009)(“Public records are presumed to be open and
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:
NING DING, YUTING LI, AND NAOMI BENSDORF FRISCH
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes, and
the First Amendment.
I.

A.

IELRA DEVELOPMENTS

Interference with Protected Activity

In James Gibson, and Cairo School District No.1, 33 PERI ¶ 123 (IELRB
May 18, 2017) the IELRB upheld the Executive Director’s dismissal of
Gibson’s unfair labor practice charges. Gibson alleged violations of section
10(a)(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the IELRA stemming from disputes he had with
his principal concerning student discipline and the employer’s response to
Gibson’s request for a medical leave of absence asking Gibson to provide
medical documentation. With respect to the 10(a)(5) charge alleging a
failure to bargain in good faith, the IELRB followed its decision in
Thornton Community Unit School District No. 4, 4 PERI 1010 (IELRB
1987) and ruled that Section 14 (a)(5) involves the rights of the exclusive
representative under the Act, and therefore, Gibson did not have standing
to bring Section 14 (a)(5) of Act violations.
The IELRB dismissed the 10(a)(1), (3) and (4) charges as well. The IELRB
reasoned that to establish a prima facie case, Gibson had to prove that he
engaged in protected concerted activity, that the employer knew of that
activity, and that the employer took adverse action against him because of
such activity. The IELRB emphasized that “[i]n order to violate any of the
above Sections of the Act, an employer’s conduct toward the employee must
constitute an adverse action. In order to constitute an adverse action, an
employer’s conduct must change the employee’s terms and conditions of
employment.”
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In Gibson’s case, IELRB held that the different opinions regarding student
discipline did not fundamentally alter the terms or conditions of Gibson’s
employment, and thus such differences did not amount to an adverse
action. As for the medical leave, IELRB held that handling of the leave
request had no substantial effect on the terms and conditions of Gibson’s
employment and therefore was not an adverse action.
B.

Strikes and Strike Injunctions

In Chicago Board of Education and Teachers Union, Local No.1, AFT 33,
PERI ¶ 124 (2017), the IELRB granted Chicago Board of Education’s
request for injunctive relief against what the IELRB found was a planned
illegal strike.
On April 5, 2017, the union’s House of Delegates adopted a resolution that
union members would report for work on May 1, 2017, but would also
participate in labor and community actions and city-wide demonstrations
and would teach lessons emphasizing the role of labor and immigrant labor
in establishing and protecting human rights and a resolution encouraging
members to use personal business days to participate in labor and
immigrants’ rights marches on May 1. The union posted on its website a list
of May 1 activities scheduled throughout the day and a statement that it
vigorously defended the rights of members to use personal business or
unpaid “0” days to attend. It stated it would fund busses for 25 or more
persons from a school to go to the activities, but it later changed that by
limiting the funding to transportation for after school activities.
There was no dispute that the union had not complied with the IELRA’s
requirements for a lawful strike. The critical issue was whether the union’s
actions constituted a strike. The IELRB held that a strike was a concerted
failure to report for work. In this case, the IELRB concluded, the union’s
website reflected that the union was orchestrating a concerted failure by
teachers to report for work on May 1, which constituted a strike.
ILERB Member Sered dissented. She cited Chicago Transit Auth. v. ILRB,
386 Ill. App. 3d 556, 898 N.E.2d 176 (1st Dist. 2008) for the proposition
that making plans for an illegal strike did not constitute an unfair labor
practice. She further argued that the union’s encouraging members to use
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personal business days to take May 1 off and engage in marches and other
activities did not constitute a strike. Rather, she criticized the majority for
finding illegal the use of earned benefit time to engage in protected
concerted activities. She maintained that the employer’s remedy was for
principals to deny personal leave requests once they exceeded the number
of teachers in a given school allowed to be off on personal business in a
single day, insist that the other teachers report to school on May 1 and
discipline those who did not.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Covered Employees

In SEIU Local 73 v. ILRLB., 2017 IL App (4th) 160347 (June 27, 2017), the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District upheld the ILRB State
Panel’s determination that certain employees of the Secretary of State are
not “public employees” under the meaning of section 3(n) of the Act.
Therefore, these employees cannot be included in a bargaining unit.
In 2012, the union filed a unit clarification petition to include these
employees, who were all then unrepresented Executive I and Executive II
titled positions within the Secretary of State’s office. The Board granted the
union’s petition, but while the Secretary’s appeal was pending, the Illinois
legislature amended the IPLRA to specifically exclude “position
classification[s] of Executive I or higher” in the Secretary of State’s office
from the definition of “public employee.” As a result, this petition was reconsidered. The Secretary also sought unit clarification, and exclusion
from the bargaining unit, for employees classified as DFM I and DFM II.
Based on the new definition and witnesses’ testimony that the job duties of
DFM I and DFM II are more or less identical to that of Executive I and
Executive II, the Sate Panel found all four positions excluded from the
definition of “public employee” and therefore from the bargaining unit. On
appeal, the court upheld the ILRB’s interpretation of the language of the
amendment and its decision. Because Executive I and II positions are
expressly excluded from the definition of “public employee,” there was no
error of fact or law in finding they were excluded from the unit. After reexamining the facts, the court found that the board did not err in finding
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that the DFM I and DFM II positions “authorize, either directly or
indirectly, meaningful input into government decision-making on issues
where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their
implementation.” It further found that the ILRB correctly interpreted the
language of the Act which also excludes Secretary of State employees who
meet the aforementioned definition from the definition of “public
employee” under the Act. The Court upheld the exclusion of the Executive I
and II and DFM I and II positions in the Secretary of State’s office from the
bargaining unit.
B.

Duty to Bargain

In International Association of Firefighters, Local 413 v. City of Rockford,
Case No. S-CA-15-030 (ILRB State Panel Apr. 11, 2017), the State Panel
rejected the ALJ’s finding that the city had committed an unfair labor
practice by failing to include tentatively agreed-upon language in the final
collective bargaining agreement. Under Article 13, Section 1 of the 20092012 contract, the employer created policies and procedures regarding
medical certifications for sick leaves. This section allowed the employer to
issue rules and regulations as long as the union was provided with advance
notice and an opportunity to grieve. A new process for getting medical
certification for sick leave, promulgated under this section, was grieved in
August, 2011. The parties agreed to discuss the terms of the leave policy
during bargaining for the successor agreement. The parties did eventually
reach a tentative agreement on the terms of a new medical certification
process for sick leave. However, it did not appear in the successor
agreement at the conclusion of bargaining. The union filed an unfair labor
practice charge under Section 10(a)(4) of the IPLRA, claiming that this
failure to include the medical certification language was a repudiation of
the collective bargaining process. The ALJ agreed with the union, finding
that the evidence showed that the parties reached a “meeting of the minds”
with regards to the medical certification language.
On appeal, the State Panel rejected the ALJ’s finding, because both parties
had different, but reasonable interpretations of where the new language
would appear. The union reasonably believed the language would appear in
the collective bargaining agreement, but the employer reasonably believed
that the parties had agreed on language of a new rule promulgated under
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Article 13, Section 1. Since the parties did not agree on where the language
would appear, there was no violation of Section 10(a)(4). The Panel urged
the parties to be more specific in their next round of negotiations.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Fair Share Fees

In Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.2017), two public employees
brought a First Amendment challenge to the collection by their unions of
“fair share” fees. State employees who object to a union’s political activities
may pay only their “fair share,” or a fee which covers just the
representational activities of the union. Mark Janus and Brian Trygg were
allowed to intervene in Governor Rauner’s 2015 suit which claimed that
even fair share fees are unconstitutional as a tacit approval of the union.
Mr. Rauner, suffering no harm by the collection of such fees, lacked
standing to bring his suit, but the court allowed these plaintiffs to
intervene. Practically, the court found no real substantive difference
between (1) dismissing Governor Rauner’s suit and letting Janus and Trygg
start over and (2) allowing Janus and Trygg to intervene and continue the
case through the appeals process. Given the precedent set in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), that fair share fees are
constitutional, the plaintiffs were bound to lose. The dismissal of the
Seventh Circuit was necessary for the plaintiffs to appeal to the Supreme
Court and attempt to overrule Abood.
However, the court made one important distinction between the dismissals
of each plaintiff’s case. Mark Janus’ case was dismissed for failing to state a
claim under the law. However, Brian Trygg had previously challenged his
fair share obligations at the labor board. Mr. Trygg based his original claim
on a provision in the Illinois Labor Relations Act, 5 ILCS § 315-6(g), which
allows employees who object to fair share fees on religious grounds to
instead donate the amount to the charity of their choice. After lengthy
litigation, the Board granted Trygg the relief he sought. The Seventh Circuit
held that this earlier litigation prevented Trygg from being a party to the
current claim. While the Board’s decision was pending appeal in the Illinois
courts, he could have raised but failed to raise the First Amendment issue;
therefore he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the current issue.
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Trygg’s suit was dismissed under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Only
Janus is left standing as a plaintiff on the petition for writ of certiorari,
filed June 6, 2017. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, a full panel will
have a chance to reconsider the issue of fair share fees, the constitutionality
of which was upheld by a 4-4 Court in Friedrichs v. California Teachers
Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016).

